The memorandum of understanding between the United States and Iran was apparently signed over the weekend, but the text remains a mystery to most. Donald Trump says he’ll release it and even read it himself so nobody can misunderstand it. If it’s such good news, though, why not put it out right now? Israel isn’t a fan of it, nor are those who believe we’ve abandoned the Iranian people by making a deal with the IRGC. At the same time, there may be a silent majority that cares less about the politics and more about the price at the pump. And that’s what caught my attention.
Since the beginning of May, with Iran closing the Strait of Hormuz, gas prices in the United States have fallen. Not by a little, but by a lot. The national average has gone from roughly $4.50 a gallon to $3.50. That happened while the strait was closed and before any memorandum of understanding was announced. The White House wasn’t bragging about it. They weren’t loudly telling Iran that the closure wasn’t working. That made me think something else was going on.
After digging through it, I’ve been able to dig up a few explanations. The most public, I’d argue, was the Strategic Petroleum Reserve. The Department of Energy released more than 53 million barrels as part of a broader international effort, bringing the reserve down to its lowest level since 1983. There were also reports that the United States was helping move oil out of the Gulf using some of the same techniques Iran has historically used to evade sanctions. American production remained high. Every hint of a peace deal pushed oil prices lower. Global demand softened. China sharply reduced its purchases on the open market. Alternative routes around Hormuz became more important. Gasoline inventories improved. All of it pushed prices down.
If I rank the reasons, peace-talk optimism sits at the top. Strategic reserve releases bought time. American-supported workarounds moved real barrels. Demand destruction, especially with China stepping back, reduced pressure. Improved gasoline inventories helped. Some of the more speculative theories include sanctions waivers for Iranian oil, greater tolerance for shadow-fleet shipments, and alternate export routes making Hormuz less decisive than Iran hoped.
What stands out is that there were more American incentives to get to the table than Iranian ones. The Strategic Petroleum Reserve is a temporary band-aid. Smuggling oil out of the Gulf is risky. Every day the Strait of Hormuz remained closed carried economic and military risks. That helps explain why the White House wanted a deal. Iran had incentives too, especially if China was no longer buying at previous levels, but the balance of pressure appears different than many expected.
My assumption remains what it has been for weeks: there are multiple power centers inside Iran, and the biggest question is whether any deal can survive them. The Ayatollah is gone, much of Iran’s leadership structure has been shattered, and the IRGC itself appears divided between factions willing to make a deal and hardliners who want to keep fighting. The memorandum of understanding may give us a clearer picture when we finally see it. Until then, the biggest question isn’t whether a deal exists. It’s whether anyone on the Iranian side can actually enforce it.
Chapters
00:00:00 - Intro
00:02:38 - Iran and Gas Prices
00:31:47 - Update
00:32:04 - UFC 250 Terrorism Plot
00:37:46 - Russia-Ukraine
00:39:48 - Primaries
00:42:48 - Interview with Maria Curi
01:11:46 - Wrap-up
